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Buenos Aires and Chicago grew during the nineteenth century for remarkably similar reasons.  Both
cities were conduits for moving meat and grain from fertile hinterlands to eastern markets.  However,
despite their initial similarities, Chicago was vastly more prosperous for most of the 20th century.
Can the differences between the cities after 1930 be explained by differences in the cities before that
date?  We highlight four major differences between Buenos Aires and Chicago in 1914.  Chicago was
slightly richer, and significantly better educated.  Chicago was more industrially developed, with about
2.25 times more capital per worker.  Finally, Chicago’s political situation was far more stable and
it wasn’t a political capital.   Human capital seems to explain the lion’s share of the divergent path
of the two cities and their countries, both because of its direct effect and because of the connection














I.  Introduction 
 
Both Buenos Aires and Chicago grew enormously over the late 19
th century as nodes of a 
transportation network that brought the produce of the New World’s rich, but relatively 
unpopulated, hinterlands to the tables of the world.  (Figure 1 shows the parallel population 
growth of both places.)   In the early 1900s, the two cities dominated meat-packing in the 
Americas and were great centers of grain shipments.  About one-half of the populations of both 
cities were immigrants, who had come to take advantage of high wages in these urban areas.  
Both cities were governed by functioning but imperfect democracies, and both were famous for 
their corruption.     
Over the course of the 20
th century, the paths of the two cities have, of course, significantly 
diverged, just as the paths of Argentina and the U.S. have diverged.  Buenos Aires has had faster 
population growth, but Chicago has become much richer and has also been generally free of the 
regime-changing political uprisings that have challenged the Argentine capital.
2  In this paper, 
we ask whether differences between the cities at the start of the 20
th century can help us to make 
sense of their divergent paths since then.   
On a functional level, the cities in 1900 appear quite similar.  In both cases, rail lines brought 
wheat and beef into the port.  From there, the beef was processed and the produce shipped east.  
The stockyards that carve up cattle and pigs are big employers in both places.  Refrigeration 
significantly aids the exports of both cities.  By 1910, the income gap between the two cities had 
closed to the point where real wages were about 70 percent higher in Chicago, which is 
substantially less than the gap was in 1890 or today.     
Yet there were significant differences in Chicago and Buenos Aires even in 1910, beyond that 
income gap.  First, the education levels of Chicago residents seem to have been much higher.  
                                                            
2 The events at the 1968 Democratic Convention were as close as Chicago ever came to toppling a government.   
While many observers link the Chicago riots with Richard Nixon’s success in the election, it remains true that Nixon 
came to power through an electoral process that is quite different from the paths to power of several 20
th century 
Argentine leaders.     3
This difference does not reflect educational enrollments, which seem broadly similar after 1884 
Argentine education reform.  Instead, the adults coming into Buenos Aires seem to have been 
much less educated than those coming into Chicago.  The main reason for this difference is that 
rural-urban migrants in the U.S. were much better educated, reflecting the strength of the 
American common school movement in the early 19
th century.  Chicago also had more German 
immigrants, who were relatively well educated, while Buenos Aires disproportionately attracted 
immigrants from the less well educated countries of Spain and Italy.   
Second, Chicago moved much more quickly towards being an industrial producer as well as a 
transformer of raw commodities.  Capital per worker appears to have been about 2.44 times 
higher in Chicago than in Buenos Aires in 1914.  Value added per worker appears to have been 
2.25 times higher in Chicago, which can readily explain the 70 percent wage gap.  Chicago’s 
production of goods was, to a large extent, oriented towards providing goods for the prosperous 
Midwestern hinterland.  The market for Buenos Aires-made manufactured goods was much 
smaller, because the Argentine farmers were much poorer.  Moreover, Chicago had a long track 
record of innovation, and in many areas, such as mechanical reapers, it was on the forefront of 
new technologies.  By contrast, Argentina was an importer of technological ideas through much 
of the 20
th century.  Chicago’s higher human capital levels may help explain why Chicago was 
more technologically developed, but in any event, by 1930, Chicago is essentially an industrial 
town, while Buenos Aires is still focused on raw food production and commerce.   
Last but not least, political forces in Buenos Aires and Chicago were different.  While Chicago 
had universal manhood suffrage since the Civil War, Buenos Aires had a much more limited 
electoral base until 1914.  More importantly, Buenos Aires is Argentina’s capital while Chicago 
is not the capital of the U.S.  The combination of commerce and politics in Buenos Aires means 
that uprisings in the city have the ability to topple national governments.  Comparable uprisings 
in Chicago, such as the Haymarket riot, were only of local concern.  The concentration of 
population in Buenos Aires seems to have made the country less politically stable.   
In the fourth section of this paper, we attempt to assess the relative importance of these 
difference factors by using cross-national evidence.  Inevitably, this pulls us away from a city-
level focus to a more national perspective.  We examine the ability of pre-World War I variables, 
including income, industrialization, education, urbanization and political instability to explain   4
cross-section income variation today.  All of these variables are strongly correlated with current 
per capita GDP levels, but measures of schooling in 1900 have the strongest connection to 
modern income.  Using coefficients from cross-national regressions, we estimate that the 
differences in education between Argentina and the U.S. in 1900 can, in a mechanical 
decomposition, explain almost all of the differences in current income levels.   
But why is the connection between historical education levels and current income so tight?  The 
direct effect of education on earnings can explain only a small portion of the link.  Education, 
however, is also correlated with political outcomes.  Stable democracies are much rarer in less 
well educated countries (Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer, 2007).    Lower levels of education in 
Argentina can help us to understand that nation’s 20
th century political problems.  However, 
education also seems to have a strong direct impact on national income levels, which can, 
perhaps be understood as stemming from the connection between area-level human capital and 
the state of technological development.    
 
II.  Chicago del Plata; Buenos Aires on Lake Michigan 
 
We begin by stressing the profound similarities between the economic models of Chicago and 
Buenos Aires in the 19
th century.   As late as 1880, 72 percent of the U.S. population was rural.  
The great wealth of the country came from its vast expanses of fertile land.  No area was more 
fertile than the hinterland of Chicago:  Illinois and Iowa.  The rich black soil of America’s Corn 
Belt yielded an average of 39 bushels per acre in 1880, about 50 percent more than the older corn 
producing areas of Kentucky.  That higher productivity explains why Chicago passed Cincinnati 
as America’s pig-producing polis.   
America’s vast hinterland was enormously rich, but at the start of the 19
th century that land was 
virtually inaccessible.  It cost as much to ship goods 32 miles over land as it did to ship them 
across the ocean.  Over the course of the 19
th century, Americans built a transportation network 
that managed to move agricultural produce far more cheaply over space.  Cities, like Chicago 
and Cincinnati, were nodes on that transportation network.  Typically, large cities formed in 
places where goods needed to move from one form of transport to another.     5
The growth of Chicago depended on two canals.  The first canal, the Erie, connected the great 
lakes to the Hudson River, and through it the city of Chicago was able to ship by water all the 
way to New York and the outside world.  The second canal was the Illinois and Michigan canal, 
which connected the Chicago River to the Mississippi River system.  Chicago’s first boom 
decades, the 1830s, coincided with speculation related to the completion of the canal.  Those two 
canals situated Chicago as the lynchpin of a watery arc that ran from New Orleans to New York.    
As it turned out, railroads became even more important in connecting Chicago to the west.  
Starting in 1848, the Chicago and Galena railroad connected the city westward.  While initially 
intended to move lead, the rail connected to Iowa and became a conduit for agricultural produce, 
particularly pigs.  Corn is an enormously calorie-intensive crop, but it is relatively expensive to 
ship.  Hence corn was typically fed to pigs and those pigs were moved across space.  To reap 
economies of scale, Chicago became a stockyard city specializing in turning live pigs into easy-
to-move salted meat.   
Typically, mankind has tended to be more interested in salted pig products (bacon, sausage, ham) 
than in salted beef products.  For that reason, in the middle 19
th century, pigs were slaughtered in 
Chicago before their movement east, while cows were shipped live.  One great transport 
innovation in 19
th century Chicago was the four-season refrigerated rail car, used by Gustavus 
Swift.  (His engineer’s brilliant insight was to put the ice on top of the meat so it dripped down.)  
After Swift began using refrigerated cars, Chicago increasingly shipped prepared beef, instead of 
cattle on the hoof, as well as prepared pigs.   
The final element in Chicago’s agricultural shipping empire was its increasing role as a center 
for grain shipments.   Wheat has less value per ton than pork or beef, and as a result high 
shipping costs in the middle 19
th century meant that wheat typically traveled short distances.  
Rochester, New York, for example was America’s flour city in its early years, specializing in 
milling grain on its way to New York City.  As transportation costs fell, and as hard spring wheat 
made the cold areas north of Chicago more productive, wheat increasingly came east from the 
old northwest.   Chicago, as the Midwest’s premier transport center, became a conduit for 
shipping grain as well as shipping beef and pork.     6
Buenos Aires’ evolution in the 19
th century is broadly similar to that of Chicago. The similarities 
start with the fact that what turned Buenos Aires into a major commercial hub was its 
exceptionally fertile hinterland, rather than an exceptionally located port (at least when compared 
to possible competitors such as Montevideo). The developments in terms of the accessibility of 
this hinterland to the main networks of international trade were once again the key in 
determining the patterns followed by the city’s evolution.   In 1850, transportation across the 
Atlantic was slow and expensive, dependent on sailing ships.  Argentina therefore specialized in 
exporting products that were extremely durable, such as hides and tallow.  In the 1840s, Buenos 
Aires was exporting more than two million hides per year and ten thousand tons of tallow 
(Brown 1976).  Wool was also a major export.  Notably, these were the same products being 
produced in the region around Los Angeles around the same time and for the same reason.  
Distant places with abundant land were best used to produce goods that could last for months 
during a long sea voyage.   
Over the course of the 19
th century, Argentina moved to higher value agricultural products, first 
meat and then grain.  In the middle years of the 19
th century, Argentina was further away from 
European markets and had a much higher ratio of land to population than the U.S.  For example, 
in 1880, Argentina was composed of 2.7 million square kilometers and had around 2.5 million 
people.  The U.S. had 8 million square kilometers of land and 50 million people.  The vast 
amounts of space in Argentina made herding relatively more attractive than intensive agriculture.  
While Argentina actually imported breadstuffs from Chile, in the mid-1870s, it had more than 45 
million sheep and more than 5 million cattle.  Since cattle and sheep complement open ranges 
more than pigs, beef became the primary export item for Argentina.  They were, of course, and 
still are overwhelmingly grass fed, whereas U.S. beef primarily eats corn.  
Initially, the cattle exports were hides and some salted beef (a bit more than 20 thousand tons per 
year during the 1850s).  The market for salted beef, such as beef jerky, was never particularly 
robust and this limited the growth of Argentine export trade.   Two big transport innovations, 
however, enabled Argentina to grow dramatically as a meat exporter.  First, starting in the 1840s, 
steam replaced sail on the cross-Atlantic journeys, reducing travel times by as much as two thirds 
(from over 70 days to less than 25).  Second, in 1875, refrigerated ships, or frigoríficos, made it 
possible to ship chilled beef and mutton.   The impact of refrigeration was even greater on   7
Buenos Aires than it was in Chicago, because the distances between Buenos Aires and London 
precluded the shipment of live cattle in large numbers before the 1880s.    
With the coming of the frigoríficos, Buenos Aires became a large exporter of frozen and chilled 
beef and mutton.  During the early years of chilled transport, mutton was actually a more 
important export than beef, because “mutton, unlike beef, is not injured materially in quality, 
flavor and appearance by the freezing and thawing process,” (Hanson, 1938, p. 84).  By 1892, 
Argentina was exporting more than a million sheep carcasses annually.   Faster transportation 
was also making it easier to export vast amounts of live cattle and sheep to the United Kingdom 
and other European markets, and by the turn of the century, 500,000 live sheep and 100,000 live 
cattle were being exported annually from Argentina to the England.    
The vast increase in the amount of chilled beef exported from Argentina, much of it through 
Buenos Aires, actually occurred during the early years of the 20
th century.   Between 1900 and 
1916, Argentina’s exports of frozen beef increased from 26,000 tons to 411,000 tons.  About a 
third of those frozen carcasses were coming through the port of Buenos Aires, which was 
growing as a center for slaughtering and refrigeration, as well as shipping.   
The final step in the agricultural development of Argentina also mirrors the changes in Chicago.  
Just as the decline in shipping costs made it more attractive to ship wheat from the west to New 
York via Chicago, easier shipping costs made wheat a more attractive export for Argentina.  As 
late as the 1870s, Argentina was exporting essentially no wheat.  By 1904, the Argentines were 
exporting more than two million tons of it per year.   
The growth of the wheat trade was accompanied by a vast transformation on the Pampas.  Land 
that had been used as open range became used for intensive wheat cultivation.  By 1910, 10 
million acres in the province of Buenos Aires were being used to grow wheat.  The population of 
Buenos Aires’ hinterland rose dramatically as immigrants came to farm. In thirty years, 
Argentina moved from having essentially no cereal production to becoming one of the world’s 
three largest grain exporters.   
The roots of this transformation also lay in better transportation technologies.   Across the 
Atlantic, faster and faster steam ships made it cheaper to ship grain.  Starting in the 1850s, a rail 
network was created within Argentina, generally supported by the government and mostly   8
connecting Buenos Aires to places in the hinterland. (In yet another interesting parallel, just as a 
New England-born shipping magnate, John Murray Forbes, built some of the first rails that 
connected Chicago, a New England-born shipping magnate, William Wheelwright, built some of 
the first rail tracks in Argentina.)  Rail allowed population to disperse through the hinterland, and 
it also brought goods into Buenos Aires to be processed and shipped out; quite crucially, it made 
it less expensive to ship grain to the capital.  While cattle and sheep could walk on their own to 
the port, grain always needed to be shipped.  As a result, grain particularly benefited from the 
improvements in rail.   
In sum, like Chicago, Buenos Aires initial attraction was its harbor and waterways – the River 
Plata was an avenue into the interior – located next to an exceptionally fertile hinterland.  The 
rail network, which centered at the capital, only increased Buenos Aires’ place at the hub of 
Argentina’s internal transport network, just as rail only increased Chicago’s importance in the 
Midwest. The comparison did not escape contemporary observers, such as U.S. Trade 
Commissioner Herman G. Brock, who noted that “like Chicago, [Buenos Aires] has all the 
resources of the broad pampas at its doors and is the terminus of a dozen railways whose 
network of transportation covers the Republic from north to south and east to west, all feeding 
directly or indirectly into the capital.” (Brock, 1919, p. 13)    
By 1910 both Chicago and Buenos Aires were “nature’s metropolises.”  Both cities had grown 
great as conduits that moved the wealth of American hinterlands to more densely populated 
markets.  In both cases, beef and wheat played a disproportionate role in the commerce of the 
cities.  In both cases, improved shipping technologies, especially refrigeration, enabled the cities 
to grow.   
Yet the 20
th century time paths of these places were quite different.  By population, Buenos Aires 
grew faster, but by most other measures of progress Chicago dramatically passed its southern 
rival, just as the income gap between the U.S. and Argentina widened.    Is it possible to see, in 
the differences between the two cities a century ago, the roots of their 20
th century divergence?   
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III.  Four Differences between Buenos Aires and Chicago in 1910 
 
In this section, we discuss four major areas in which Buenos Aires and Chicago differed a 
century ago.  In the next section, we connect these differences to the history of the cities and 
their countries since then.     
Incomes 
Income levels are the natural starting point for understanding what was similar and different 
between the U.S. and Argentina, so we first look at wage data for the two countries (plus Great 
Britain and Italy) from 1870 to 1970 (data from Williamson, 1995b) in Figure 2a-2c.  (The 
wages are normalized so that the British wage in 1905 equals 100.)  At the start of the time 
period, wages in the United States are more than 50 percent higher than wages either in Great 
Britain or Argentina.  Wages in those places are about the same and about double the wages in 
Italy.    
Between 1870 and the early 1890s, Argentina experienced a remarkable 66 percent increase in 
real wages.  Argentina’s spectacular real wage increase was accompanied by, and probably 
created by, the aforementioned improvements in shipping technology that enabled Argentine 
mutton and beef to efficiently be shipped to European markets.  Argentine land was made much 
more productive by the ability to ship meat quickly and that seems to have greatly increased the 
marginal productivity of labor.   
Argentina was not alone in experiencing real wage increases during the late 19
th century.  
American wages increased by amount the same proportion, so that in 1892 (a high water mark 
for Argentine wages), American wages remained 60 percent above those in Argentina.   Wages 
in Argentina and Britain remained quite similar and about double the wages in Italy, which sent 
many immigrants to the U.S. and Argentina during this period.  Spain, another exporter of people 
to Argentina, also had wages that were about one-half of those in Argentina.   
Of course, these aggregate wage series don’t particularly tell us about similar workers in the two 
cities.  To make the scales somewhat more comparable, Figure 3 shows monthly wages in 
Chicago from the U.S. Census in 1939 dollars.  In Chicago, these wages rose substantially over   10
the 1880s and then remained remarkably static in real terms from 1890 to 1920.  Over this time 
period, of course, the size of Chicago’s large force was increasing dramatically.  The city 
expanded from 500,000 to 2.7 million.  That vast influx of labor surely played a major role in 
keeping wage growth modest.   The slower population growth over the 1920s, when America 
substantially reduced the flow of foreign immigrants, may explain rising real wages during that 
decade.   
We do not have data on wages in Buenos Aires itself.  Instead, we are forced to use national 
industrial data.  However, much of Argentina’s industry was in the capital, so this should give us 
some sense about wage levels for manufacturing workers in Buenos Aires.  While there are many 
ups and downs, over the whole period, Argentine industrial workers become steadily better paid, 
as shown in the Williamson data.   Throughout the entire period, however, the workers in 
Chicago were earning more in real terms than the workers in Buenos Aires.  During most of the 
time, the wage gap was approximately 70 percent.  At the start of the century, before the great 
divergence, there was already a very substantial income gap between the two cities.   
Why were the workers in Chicago, many of whom were doing comparable things, earning much 
more?    Classical economics pushes us to consider wages as the intersection of labor supply and 
labor demand.  Labor demand, in turn, reflects the marginal productivity of labor.  The higher 
wages in Chicago, therefore, imply that labor was more productive in that city.  Why? 
There are three primary hypotheses.  First, the workers in Chicago had more skills than the 
workers in Buenos Aires.  We will treat this hypothesis in the next section, where we document 
significantly greater education levels in Chicago.  This gap surely explains some of the 
difference.  However, evidence on wages and schooling from within the U.S. makes it clear that 
education differences alone cannot explain the gap.   
A second hypothesis is that Buenos Aires and Chicago had different amounts of capital, and 
greater capital levels in Chicago increased the productivity of workers in that city.  We will turn 
to that hypothesis later, when we address the industrial mixes of the two cities.  Chicago appears 
to have had about 2.44 times more capital worker, which in a standard Cobb-Douglas production 
function might suggest that wages would be 30 percent higher in Chicago.   This can explain 
almost one-half of the gap.     11
Finally, a third hypothesis is that Chicago firms were more productive, either because of more 
advanced technologies or because of the greater distances between Buenos Aires and European 
markets meant that Argentine products were worth less, at their point of production.  The 
American workers were often much closer to their customers and this decreased one cost of 
reduction, and thereby increased the marginal productivity of labor.   
The labor supply curve also gives us information about the reasons for and the nature of wage 
disparity between the Chicago and Buenos Aires.  Both cities attracted very significant amounts 
of immigration between 1890 and 1910. The 1910 census shows that 36 percent of Chicago’s 
white residents were foreign born, out of which 16 percent were from Russia, 23 percent were 
from Germany, 17 percent were from Austria and 6 percent were Italian. In Buenos Aires, the 
estimates from the Buenos Aires Statistical Annual (Anuario Estadistico de la Ciudad de Buenos 
Aires 1925) indicate that the city’s population increased by 140% over those two decades, and 
more than half of that increase was due to immigration. As a result of this massive inflow, 50 
percent of Buenos Aires’ residents were foreign born in 1914.  Buenos Aires’ immigrant 
population was by then overwhelmingly Spanish and Italian, as can be gleaned from the national 
data: in 1914, roughly 10 percent of the Argentine population was born in Spain, and 12 percent 
in Italy; natives of the two countries made up roughly three-fourths of the total foreign-born 
population of the country.  
The fact that Italian immigrants were going in large numbers to both Buenos Aires and Chicago 
is puzzling if the real wage differences are actually of the order of 70 percent.  Why would an 
Italian immigrant choose Buenos Aires over America knowing that real wages are likely to be so 
much less?  There are three possible explanations for this phenomenon.  First, it is possible that 
Buenos Aires offered amenities, like a better climate and a different culture, that were missing in 
Chicago.  Second, the immigrants going to Chicago and Buenos Aires might have actually been 
quite different.  Third, the real wage differences might have been smaller than they appear.   
The first hypothesis surely has some truth to it.   The fact that Spaniards were drawn to Buenos 
Aires, despite lower real wages, would not seem like that much of a puzzle.  After all, Argentina 
is a Spanish-speaking country with a Latin culture.  The attraction of Buenos Aires is 
understandable.  Italians were also attracted to Buenos Aires because of the similarity in 
languages (and culture) between Italy and Spain.     12
There were also substantial differences in the populations going to the U.S. and Argentina.  For 
example, between 1884 and 1886, two-thirds of the Italian immigrants coming to Argentina were 
from Northern Italy.  During the same years, 85 percent of Italian immigrants coming to the U.S. 
were from the south.  During later periods, the differences narrowed: in the 1907-1909 period, 
the number of southern Italian immigrants to Buenos Aires had soared, and 31 percent of the 
Italian immigrants came from the north.  Still, that number was much higher than in the U.S. 
were only 9 percent of Italian immigrants came from Northern Italy.   
The somewhat different regional origins suggests that, at least during the earlier periods, the U.S. 
had greater attraction for the southerners while Argentina had greater attraction for the 
northerners.  The Northerners were generally much more skilled: only about 12 percent of the 
northerners were illiterate, while 54 percent of the southerners were illiterate.  One interpretation 
is that the Southerners went to America, where industrial wages were higher.  The northerners, 
however, saw greater returns to going to Buenos Aires, which was notably lacking in more 
skilled workers. (As we will see in the next section, Buenos Aires was, throughout most of the 
period, a significantly less well educated city than Chicago.)   This suggests that the overall 
pattern of higher wages in Chicago might mask heterogeneity in the wage differentials for 
different skill profiles. 
Finally, the pull that Buenos Aires had to many immigrants does suggest that real wages might 
not have been quite as low as they seem relative to the U.S.  The economic question is how much 
of a real wage discount would immigrants have been willing to accept to live in Buenos Aires 
rather than in the U.S.   This remains an open question.   
In any event, the weight of evidence suggests that, one century ago, Chicago already had higher 
income levels than Buenos Aires. The next two subsections will dig deeper into the possible 
reasons behind that disparity. 
 
Education  
While wages were certainly lower in Buenos Aires than in Chicago, wages – correcting for 
education – differ less.   The Argentines appear to have been significantly less educated for much   13
of this time period.  Unfortunately, literacy remains the primary means of measuring education 
levels, and that, of course, is a quite coarse measure.  Nonetheless, Figure 4 shows literacy rates 
for Buenos Aires and Chicago during our period.  
In Chicago, overall literacy rates for the population aged ten or older start above 95 percent in 
1870 and stay at that level for the next 60 years.  There is a gap between native and foreign born, 
but even among foreign born Chicago residents’ literacy is never less than 87 percent.  Native 
literacy is always over 98 percent, suggesting that pretty much everyone in the city knew how to 
both read and write.   
By contrast, the Buenos Aires data suggests that less than one-half of the population could both 
read and write in 1869.  By 1895, the next available data point, the literacy rate had shot up to 72 
percent, which still meant that a substantial portion of the population was unable to either read or 
write.   It isn’t until 1939 that more than 90 percent of the population in Buenos Aires is literate.  
The data are not entirely comparable since they refer to different age groups, still the differences 
are quite striking.  
Why is there such a difference in literacy rates between the two cities? Table 1 shows school 
enrollment rates over time for Chicago and Buenos Aires.  While enrollment rates are somewhat 
higher in the U.S., the rates seem much closer than the literacy rates would suggest.  The 
political leaders who came to power after Rosas, such as Mitre and especially Sarmiento in the 
1860s and 1870s, were quite committed to public schooling.  In 1884, Argentine law made free, 
secular public schools a right – the Ley 1420 enacted by President Roca, and pushed by 
Sarmiento in his post-presidency role as head of the National Education Council.  There are good 
reasons to believe that these schooling efforts were particularly successful in the capital, as is 
apparent from the enrollment data.   As such, we can’t explain the literacy gap with different 
enrollment rates alone.    
One explanation for the difference is that immigrants who came to Argentina were significantly 
less literate than their American counterparts.  Just as in the U.S., there is a gap between native 
and foreign born Argentines.  In 1904, for example, 89 percent of native Argentines were 
literate, but only 72 percent of the foreign born in the city could read and write.  In 1900 
Chicago, by contrast, 93 percent of the foreign born were literate.   Chicago’s more Germanic   14
population appears to have been much more skilled than the southern Europeans who came to 
Argentina.  Even though Argentina received a higher share of northern Italians, this did not 
overcome the basic pattern of attracting much less literate people.   
The skill differences between Buenos Aires and Chicago don’t just reflect differences in foreign 
immigration.   They also reflect the different levels of schooling in the American hinterland.  
Chicago was a city of immigrants, but it was also a city full of farm boys and girls who had come 
to town.  Likewise, a large share of Buenos Aires residents was born outside the city in 
Argentina.  While school enrollment rates look broadly similar between Buenos Aires and 
Chicago, outside of the cities the differences in schooling look rather more substantial.    
During the first part of the 19
th century, American rural areas had embraced the common school 
movement.  Farmers throughout the country had been convinced that educating their children 
was a worthwhile endeavor that would make them more productive.  By contrast, the large 
ranches that predominated in the Argentine hinterland made no such investments in education.  
One explanation for the difference is that the returns to skill were much lower in Argentine 
ranches than in intensive agriculture.  Land appears to have been much more widely owned in 
the U.S., and skills were presumably higher for yeomen farmers than for gauchos.   
As a result, the rural areas that fed people to Chicago were reasonably well schooled.  The 
hinterland of Argentina was not, at least prior to 1880.  For example, the 1869 census shows that, 
even after the public education initiatives of the Mitre presidency (although still at the outset of 
the heavily education-minded Sarmiento presidency), only one in five Argentinean school-age 
children were enrolled in school. Since that includes data on Buenos Aires, we are led to 
conclude that the situation in the hinterland was considerably worse than that.  
How much of an earnings wedge can be explained by literacy alone?  Using data on wages by 
occupation in 1940 (the first time such data is available), we can estimate a 1940 wage for each 
occupation in the 1900 U.S. Census.  We then estimate the average 1940 wage earned by literate 
and illiterate Chicagoans.   
We find that the average wage earned by an illiterate was 56 log points lower than the average 
wage earned by someone who could read and write.  That premium survives controlling for   15
individual age, and controlling for country of origin reduces the measured premium to 34 log 
points.     
While that premium is extremely significant, it is not enough to explain most, or even much, of 
the wage gap between Chicago and Buenos Aires at the turn of the last century.  16 percent more 
of Argentina’s population was illiterate than the Chicago’s population. Multiplying 16 percent by 
even a 56 percent wage loss leads to an estimate that Buenos Aires should have had eight percent 
higher wages if illiteracy was the only thing holding them back.  This modest number is dwarfed 
by the actual 70 percent wage gap.   
Of course, illiteracy is presumably just proxying for a large educational gap between the two 
groups.  Still the wage gap seems far too large to be explained by education alone in a simple 
model where human capital produces productivity.   If the returns to schooling were about 7 
percent per annum, then Chicagoans would need to have the equivalent of ten extra years of 
schooling to explain the observed wage difference, which is wildly implausible.   
It is, of course, possible that wages impact earnings directly and through human capital 
externalities.  An example of such externalities might be that more education leads to more 
innovation and better technology for everyone.  In that case, the impact of greater skills in 
Chicago would be larger.  Still, we suspect that this effect would show up mainly in the 
occupational and industrial distribution of the two countries, and we turn to that next.  
 
Industrialization  
Both Chicago and Buenos Aires owed their growth to their roles as centers for the shipment of 
natural produce.  Both cities also developed other industries which produced goods for people 
living in the hinterland and the residents of the city itself.  Cyrus McCormick is the 
quintessential example of an industrialist who moved his mechanical reaper operation to Chicago 
in order to be close to his customers, the farmers of the Midwest.  Buenos Aires also had its 
industrialists, like Ernesto Tornquist, who invested in large factories.   
While both cities certainly had industry, Chicago’s industry developed earlier and was far more 
capital-intensive on the eve of World War I.  By 1900, 15 percent of Chicago’s population,   16
262,261 workers, labored in industrial pursuit.  Four years later, only seven percent of Buenos 
Aires’ population, 68,512 people, were in manufacturing.   After that point, however the share of 
Chicago’s workers in manufacturing stagnated while the share of Buenos Aires workers in 
manufacturing continued to rise.  As a result, their employment in industry converged.  By 1914, 
Chicago had 313,000 industrial workers, or13 percent of the city’s population.  Buenos Aires 
province had 149,000 industrial workers, which was 9.4 percent of the city’s population.   
These similar employment shares were not matched by similar levels of output.  In 1914, the 
U.S. Census writes that the value of Chicago’s industrial output is 1.48 billion dollars (or 30 
billion in current dollars); the value added by manufacturing was 581 billion dollars (or about 12 
billion dollars today).  Each Chicago worker was associated with 4728 dollars of output (about 
100,000 dollars today) or 1856 dollars of value added (about 38,000 dollars today). 
In Buenos Aires, total output was 280 million dollars and value added was 122 million dollars.  
On a per capita basis, each Buenos Aires worker was producing 1,880 dollars worth of output (or 
38,000 dollars today) and 819 dollars of value added (about 17,000 dollars today).  Per worker 
output was 2.5 times higher in Chicago than in Buenos Aires.  Per worker value added appears to 
have been 2.25 times higher in Chicago than it was in Buenos Aires.  This difference in 
productivity is much larger than the 70 percent difference in manufacturing incomes that we 
found during this time period.   
Why was manufacturing more productive in Chicago than in Buenos Aires?  One hypothesis is 
that the level of capital per worker was higher in Chicago.  In 1914, the total capital in the 
manufacturing sector was 1.19 billion dollars or 3,800 dollars per worker (78,000 today).  In 
1914, Buenos Aires had 231 million dollars worth of capital or 1,550 dollars per worker (32,000 
today).  The Chicago workers had 2.44 times more capital per worker which may help to explain 
the higher levels of productivity.   
Using a standard Cobb-Douglas production function, we can estimate whether these capital 
differences can help explain the labor productivity differences across space. This assumes that 
output equals AK
αL
1−α , where A reflects productivity, K reflects capital, L reflects labor and α 
reflects capital’s share in output (typically taken to be one-third).  This equation then implies that 
per worker productivity equals A(K/L)
α , which would equal A times the capital to labor ratio to   17
the power 1/3.   If the capital/labor ratio was 2.44 times higher in Chicago than in Buenos Aires, 
this would predict that productivity would be 34 percent higher in Chicago.  Thus, higher capital 
levels alone can only explain about 27 percent of the higher productivity levels in Chicago.  The 
remaining 73 percent of the gap in productivity must be associated with the catchall variable “A”, 
which describes total factor productivity.  To explain a 125 percent greater productivity per 
worker in Chicago, total factor productivity must be 67 percent higher in that city.   
The productivity gap can come from three sources: human capital, transportation costs and 
technological development.   We have already noted that human capital appears more developed 
in Chicago.  The Cobb-Douglas model, as written above, assumes that labor is measured in 
equivalent units.  Assuming that L equals the number of workers times human capital per 
worker, implies that per capita productivity will increase by human capital to the power 2/3.  If 
Chicago’s workers had 20 percent more human capital per worker (which seems high), then this 
would predict a 13 percent increase in productivity in Chicago, which can explain another ten 
percent of the observed productivity difference.    
This would leave about 60 percent of the productivity difference to be explained by differences 
in “A”, the productivity parameter, reflecting either more developed technologies or easier access 
to consumer markets.  It is difficult to determine how much of the difference in productivity can 
be explained by either force.  Chicago’s industrialists certainly found it easier to sell to a much 
richer and larger market in the United States.  The total GDP of the U.S. was about 18 times 
larger than the GDP of Argentina in 1913.  Argentina’s hinterland was filled with large numbers 
of relatively poor people; the farmers of the Midwest were much wealthier.   
In principle, Argentina could have exported manufactured goods to Europe, but they don’t 
appear to have done that.  Almost all of Argentina’s exports in 1914 were agricultural, which 
surely reflects the country’s comparative advantage and the large shipping costs for 
manufactured goods.  By contrast, America was an industrial exporter in 1900, and goods from 
Chicago, like McCormick’s reapers, were traveling the globe.   Still, it seems likely that these 
sales tell us more about technology than about transportation costs.  In principle, reapers built in 
Buenos Aires could have been shipped to Russia, just like those in Chicago.  It isn’t obvious that 
the costs would have been that much higher, if at all.  The difference was that Chicago was at the 
cutting edge of reaper technology, while Buenos Aires was not.      18
 A quick look at Chicago’s industrial sectors gives us a sense of the city’s level of technology.   
Table 2 lists the top five industries, by employment, for Chicago in 1910 and Buenos Aires in 
1914.  A few large industries dominated Chicago manufacturing in the years before World War 
I.  The largest sector was men’s clothing production, which employed 38,000 people in 1909.  
Another 37,000 were in foundry and machine shop products.  27,000 worked in meat-packing.  
There were also 33,000 in printing and publishing.  12,000 people worked in lumber. 12,000 
more workers made cars. 11,000 Chicagoans made furniture and refrigerator units.  The meat-
packers were directly transforming the products of Chicago’s hinterland, but the others were 
working in more advanced products.   
Clothing was also Buenos Aires largest industrial sector in 1914, with 36,000 workers.  
Moreover, the capital/labor ratios were pretty similar in both cities: both men’s clothing in 
Chicago and “dressing” (vestido y tocador) in Buenos Aires had about 750 dollars per worker in 
capital, which suggests that both industries were labor-intensive, and using relatively similar 
technologies.  In the clothing sector, the level of horsepower per capita was actually higher in 
Buenos Aires than in Chicago.   
The fact that the clothing manufacturers in Chicago were more productive presumably reflects 
more about the available market, than anything about the state of clothing production technology 
in the Windy City.   Chicago’s clothing manufacturers had particularly benefited by the 
distribution networks in the Midwest put together by Chicago-based retail pioneers, such as 
Marshall Field, John Shedd (who worked for Field), Montgomery Ward, Richard Sears and 
Julius Rosenwald (who led Sears, Roebuck after Sears).  
However, in other areas, there is much more evidence of Chicago’s technology superiority.  For 
example, Chicago had about twelve times more employment in car production in 1910 than 
Buenos Aires did in 1914.  Automobiles in that era were a cutting-edge technology.  Argentines 
would purchase plenty of cars in the teens and twenties, but the bulk of them were imported, 
often from the United States.     
Chicago had 37,000 people in foundry and machine shop products relative to 16,000 people in 
Buenos Aires in metallurgy.  However, in this case, the Americans appear to have been far more 
industrially advanced using 55,000 units of horsepower (or 1.1 per worker) as opposed to 8,000   19
(or .5 per worker) in Buenos Aires.  The Chicago workers had 2400 dollars of capital per worker; 
the blacksmiths in Buenos Aires had less than half that.  These different levels of capital suggest 
that the Argentines were following a much more primitive model of metal machine production 
than their Chicago counterparts.   
Chicago also appears to have been at the forefront of a number of technological breakthroughs, 
beyond McCormick and his reaper.  In the 19
th and early 20
th centuries, Chicago innovators 
created the skyscraper, the electric washing machine, the zipper, and a host of other significant 
inventions.  It is difficult to find any comparable breakthroughs for Buenos Aires.   
Evidence for significant differences in the state of technology also appears in many industrial 
histories.  For example, Torcuato DiTella was a leading Argentina industrialist over the first half 
of the 20
th century.   While DiTella’s first success came with a bread-kneading machine that he 
invented himself, many of his later successes came from importing American technology.  For 
example, in the 1920s, he catered to Argentina’s growing population of drivers (many of whom 
were in American cars), by providing a new gas pump through a licensing arrangement with the 
American Wayne Gas Pump company.  In the 1930s, he began making refrigerators, first 
licensing from Kelvinator and then Westinghouse.   
Why was Chicago more technologically sophisticated than Buenos Aires a century ago?  There 
were surely many reasons, but human capital seems like a particularly important explanatory 
variable.  Education helped spread ideas in the U.S. and gave engineers the background needed 
for more innovation.  The differences in schooling between the two countries help us to 
understand why America had more developed industries a century ago.   
 
Politics  
The final major difference between Buenos Aires and Chicago lies in the area of politics.  The 
Argentine Constitution of 1853 has a large number of similarities to the U.S. Constitution, which 
is not entirely coincidental, as the Argentines looked, in part, to the U.S. model.  As in the U.S., 
there are three branches of government, and a bi-cameral legislature.  The legislature included 
both a directly elected house, the Chamber of Deputies, and an indirectly elected legislature, the   20
Senate.   Moreover, between 1862 and 1930, Argentina maintained a reasonable amount of 
political stability, maintaining at least the appearance of a stable democracy.  
Beneath this appearance, however, there were at least four major areas in which Argentina and 
the United States differed for at least some of that post-Rosas time period.  First, until 1912, 
Argentinean suffrage was far more restricted than that of the United States.  For example, after 
1850, no U.S. state had property rights requirements for voting.  By 1860, any of the old tax 
requirements had also disappeared.  Of course, some American states did impose “literacy” 
qualifications, often in an attempt to exclude African-Americans from voting, but aside from 
African-Americans in southern states, essentially all American men could vote by the Civil War.   
By contrast, universal male suffrage didn’t appear in Argentina until 1912.  For example, as late 
as 1896, Banerjee, Benabou and Mookherjee (2006) estimate that only 1.6 percent of Argentina’s 
population voted, in part because of literacy and wealth requirements.  Alonso (1993) documents 
that 1.8 percent of the city’s population, or less than four percent of the male population, voted in 
the 1896 election.  By contrast, more than 40 percent of Illinois’ male population voted in the 
1896 U.S. Presidential election, which suggests a far more open democracy in Chicago than 
Argentina.   
In addition to the limits on suffrage, the Argentinean electoral system did not have a secret 
ballot. Instead, the voto cantado (“sung ballot”) – in which each voter would come to the 
electoral precinct and loudly declare his preferred candidate, upon which the electoral authority 
would write it down – guaranteed that a local caudillo could pressure voters into supporting the 
candidate of his choosing. Ironically, the allegedly liberal arguments often advanced by urban 
interests against the extension of the franchise – the idea that rural oligarchs would just 
manipulate their workers’ votes – found their match in the allegedly enlightened arguments of 
the landed oligarchy against the secret ballot, as they argued that it would deprive ignorant 
workers from the “healthy influence” of their landlords (Sampay, 1974). 
Argentina’s voting rules evolved over the period 1890-1910 (Alonso, 1993), and the country 
moved to universal manhood suffrage and the secret ballot in 1912, with the passage of the 
Sáenz Peña law.   Engerman, Haber and Sokoloff (2000) document that voter participation 
increased to nine percent (or 18 percent of the male population) in the 1916 election and 12.8   21
percent (or 25 percent of the male population) in the 1928. By 1920, both Chicago and Buenos 
Aires had mass democracy, but that democracy was much younger in Argentina.  As (at least 
some) political institutions take time to mature, the novelty of that democracy in Argentina may 
have added to its weakness.       
Not only were electoral rules different between the two cities until 1912, electoral practices were 
as well.  It is unclear if Buenos Aires or Chicago had more electoral corruption, as allegations of 
voter abuse flew in both places.  Textbooks on Argentinean history regularly describe the 
corruption of 19
th century politics. The voto cantado system, in particular, gave tremendous 
power to the electoral judges who were in charge of writing down the vote announced by each 
voter, and invited widespread corruption on their part. For example, Rock (1987) writes that 
“only a small fraction of the nominally enfranchised population voted in elections, which local 
bosses regulated by manipulating the electoral roles or by simple bribery and intimidation.” 
However, American politics during the Gilded Age was hardly a model of probity.  The tale of 
Charles Yerkes and his acquisition of traction franchises with payments to Chicago politicians, 
told in fiction by Theodore Dreiser, is among the most famous of all Gilded Age political stories. 
As late as 1960, rumors alleged that Mayor Daley had manufactured vast numbers of votes for 
John F. Kennedy in Chicago.  Since electoral fraud is hard to measure, and allegations of fraud 
abound in both places, it would be hard to claim any clear ranking between the two cities in that 
area. 
In any event, it is certainly true that mass violence was far more regular in Argentina than in the 
U.S., at least after the bloodbath of the Civil War. It is clear that elections in Chicago were not 
leading to major armed outbreaks.  America, of course, did have one election which ended up in 
open warfare, but after 1865 disagreements over outcomes did not lead to large scale battles.  
Not so in Argentina.   
Buenos Aires was no stranger to political conflict during the late 19
th century and early 20
th 
century. In 1880, 1890, 1893 and 1905, Argentina experienced major uprisings; three of those 
started in Buenos Aires, and the fourth also reached it.  The 1880 uprising was associated with 
the election of Julio Roca as President of Argentina.  Roca was seen as favoring nationalization 
over decentralization and he defeated Carlos Tejedor, a favorite in Buenos Aires.  After the   22
electoral defeat, 10,000 Buenos Aires residents rose up and a bloody battle ensued with 3,000 
casualties.  Roca secured the presidency, and the centralization of Argentina, only by suppressing 
the revolt.   
After that point, the República Conservadora (“Conservative Republic”) that lasted between 
1880 and 1916, under the oligarchic rule of the so-called Generación del ’80 (“Year ’80 
Generation”), faced constant pressure from the “Radical” opposition. This often spilled into 
armed conflict, such as in 1890, 1893, and 1905. The 1890 revolution was associated with the 
somewhat leftist Civic Union group, which was actually led by Mitre himself, and it aimed to 
topple the President Miguel Celman.  In that, the uprising succeeded, and led to the presidency of 
Carlos Pellegrini, who was a general opposing the revolt.  In 1893, an uprising led by the Radical 
Civic Union, an offshoot of the Civic Union, started in the Santa Fe region of Argentina, but also 
spilled over into the capital city.  In 1905, the Radical Civic Union led another revolt in Buenos 
Aires, which was unsuccessful.  In addition, the anarchist- and socialist-influenced labor 
movement brought about by European immigrants contributed to the political turmoil with 
massive strikes such as the “tenants’ strike” of 1907 and the “Red Week” of 1909.  
The coup of 1930, which would oust President Yrigoyen, is often seen as a turning point in 
Argentine politics, where democracy was replaced with military rule.  However, we have seen 
that this coup was hardly without precedent.  Four times between 1880 and 1905, revolts started 
or reaching Buenos Aires shook the country and often achieved a fair amount of success.  This 
suggests a degree of instability in Buenos Aires that was much more extreme than in Chicago.  
Chicago did have uprisings, most notably the Haymarket Riot of 1886 and the Chicago Race 
Riot of 1919. The labor union movement also made its presence felt, of course, as illustrated by 
the Haymarket episode, the “Teamsters’ strike” of 1905 and the “Garment strike” of 1910, all of 
which ended with many killed and injured in confrontations with police.   Broadly speaking, 
Chicago was hardly a model of social order.  Although, in 1890, homicide rates were about two 
times higher in Buenos Aires than in Chicago, by the 1920s, after Prohibition, the picture is 
essentially reversed.  
While both Chicago and Buenos Aires had uprisings, their consequences were vastly disparate. If 
the immediate consequences of the Haymarket riot were the controversial execution of seven   23
anarchists and a boost to May Day commemorations around the world, the Buenos Aires events 
had far more direct consequences for the Argentinean political system. The Revolution of the 
Park, in 1890, while defeated by government forces, still led to the fall of President Celman. The 
1893 Revolution also took over the Casa Rosada before being defeated. In fact, the consensus 
interpretation of the Sáenz Peña law among historians describes it as largely motivated by the 
rising tension and the pressure exerted by the Radical opposition, galvanized by the battle cry of 
the secret ballot and universal suffrage, and by the labor movement. As a result of the electoral 
reform, the Conservative Republic also met its demise in 1916, when the Radical Yrigoyen won 
the presidency in the first election under the new rules. 
What can explain these different consequences? The relative immaturity of the Argentine 
democracy certainly played a part, but it is also the case that the location of Buenos Aires at the 
very heart of the country’s politics, as the all-important capital city in which by 1914 more than 
one in six Argentineans lived, made Porteño turmoil more consequential. In fact, Argentina still 
is one of the countries with the highest concentration of population around the capital city in the 
whole world – it has the highest concentration among countries with large territories – using the 
measure developed in Campante and Do (2009).   
The centrality of Buenos Aires, of course, is not simply related to its designation as the capital 
city. From the very early years of the independent Republic, the city’s enormous weight in terms 
of population and economic activity, which was engendered by its position as the gateway to the 
hinterland and by the low labor intensity of the dominant cattle-raising activity, posed a constant 
challenge to the Argentinean federal system. This is illustrated by the perennial tension between 
the Province of Buenos Aires – which was still fighting the idea of joining the Union, in the 
battlefield, as late as 1862 – and the other provinces, which culminated in the federalization of 
the city of Buenos Aires in 1880. Chicago, in contrast, was a relative latecomer to the Union, 
which the state of Illinois joined more than forty years after independence – and Chicago, of 
course, is not even the capital of that state. 
In any event, the fact is that the 1890 Revolution, for instance, started in the Artillery Park, 
located a half-mile from the Casa Rosada. The Haymarket riot, in contrast, took place some 700 
miles away from the White House. For this reason, it is very likely that the political and social 
instability that brewed in the similar environments of Chicago and Buenos Aires, both of which   24
were undergoing rapid transformation, had much more detrimental consequences for Argentina 
in terms of the consolidation of its democracy. 
There is a strong connection between urban concentration in and around a primate capital and 
political instability (Ades and Glaeser, 1995), which reflects causality running in both directions.  
For at least 2500 years, urban mobs have had the ability to force political change.  In 509 b.c., 
Lucius Junius Brutus led the coup that ousted the last Roman King.  In 411, Athenian democracy 
was ended by another urban coup.  The history of Europe’s great medieval cities, like Bruges, is 
replete with organized opposition to aristocratic rules.  France’s political instability in the 19
th 
century owes much to the power of Parisian mobs to topple governments.   
The fundamental ingredient in a successful revolt is scale (Campante and Do 2007).  Isolated 
activists can do little to challenge a government.  Urban density makes it easier to form 
connections, which can create a sufficiently large uprising.  Riots are, after all, a primarily urban 
phenomenon (DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1997).   The political importance, however, of urban riots 
depends on their proximity to power.  That explains why uprisings in Buenos Aires were so 
much more important than those in Chicago.   
The political power of urban mobs can lead to two political responses.  The first is to placate the 
mob with public handouts and services (Campante and Do 2007).  Classical Rome’s vast bread 
doles, for example, can be understood as an attempt to cool the mobs organized by the Gracchus 
and others.  The general tendency of developing countries to target public services to the capital 
is a more modern example of this phenomenon.  Of course, placating urban unrest has the effect 
of then further expanding the size of the capital city.  For this reason, the connection between 
political instability and capital size is two-sided.  A large capital appears to create instability, and 
instability means that services flow to the capital which attracts migrants and further increases its 
size.   
In some cases, political leaders respond to the threat created by urban unrest by moving their 
capital far away from the city (Campante and Do 2007, 2009).  When Peter the Great moved his 
capital to St. Petersburg he was protecting his regime from the influence of Muscovites.  
Likewise, America’s founders chose to create a new capital on the Potomac, in part to reduce the 
influence of people in New York and Philadelphia (America’s first capitals).  America’s largest   25
riot, the 1863 New York City draft riot, could have had a much larger influence on history if 
New York, rather than Washington, had been the capital of the U.S.    
In light of these facts, we are led to conclude that the large, primate capital of Argentina might 
have played a major role in the nation’s 20
th century political problems.    
 
IV. Did those Differences Matter? 
 
We have argued that, despite the enormous similarities between Chicago and Buenos Aires, there 
were substantial differences in income, education, industrial development and political 
institutions.   The main question that remains is the extent to which each one of those differences 
might be able to account for the different paths of Buenos Aires and Chicago, and more broadly 
those of Argentina and the U.S., in the 20
th century. In principle, any one of those differences 
could have played a role.  A “big push” theory of growth (e.g. Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943, Murphy, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1989) might suggest that higher levels of income could have put the U.S. on 
a path towards industrialization.  Human capital might have influenced growth directly, or 
indirectly through industrial development or political change.  The fact that Buenos Aires was far 
less industrial than Chicago, and far more dependent on natural resources, set the stage for the 
declines of the 1930s, when the price of natural resources plummeted.  The political differences 
of Buenos Aires might have played a role in explaining the political traumas that Argentina 
experienced over the 20
th century.   
 
A system with two countries and four potential explanatory variables is, of course, 
overdetermined.  The only way to evaluate the relative importance of these four factors is to 
bring in other countries.  We will do this directly, by running a set of cross-national regressions, 
while drawing on the long literature on the determinants of differences in country-level 
prosperity, such as Hall and Jones (1999).  Although the limitations of cross-country regressions 
are well known, they can nevertheless provide us with a benchmark quantitative assessment of 
our candidate explanations. 
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We start from the premise that there is a link between relevant outcomes such as income today 
and variables in the early 20
th century, and that we can look at 100-year regressions at the cross-
country level to estimate the impact that the latter have on the former.  We then multiply these 
estimated coefficients by the differences in initial conditions between the U.S. and Argentina, to 
get a sense of the amount of today’s differences that can be explained by the different initial 
conditions in this specific comparison.  Essentially, we are assuming a model of the form: 
 
(1)  ∑ + =
i j j i i j Today X Y ε β , 1900 , ,  ,  
 
where  j Today Y ,  is country j’s outcome today,  i β  is the coefficient on explanatory variable i, 
j i X , 1900 ,  is the value of explanatory variable i in country j in 1900 and   j ε  is a country specific 
error term.  This estimating equation then suggests that the differences in outcomes between 
Argentina and the U.S. today can be understood as:  
 
(2)  ( ) Argentina i US Argentina i US i i Argentina Today US Today X X Y Y ε ε β ∑ − + − = − , 1900 , , 1900 , , ,  
 
The ratio  ( )
Argentina Today US Today




, 1900 , , 1900 ,
−
− β
 is the share of the current differences between Argentina 
and the U.S. that can be explained by variable i.  The cross-country regressions will furnish our 
estimates of the coefficients i β .   
 
Our primary outcome variable is the logarithm of per capita GDP in 2000, calculated using 
purchasing power parity and taken from the Maddison (2008) data set. Since GDP is typically 
measured at the country, not city level, we will be using national GDP measures and national 
characteristics a century ago.  Using this variable, the difference in log of GDP per capita 
between the U.S. and Argentina is 1.2, which means that American incomes were 230 percent 
higher than those in Argentina in 2000.  This is, of course, much larger than the 48 percent 
difference shown in 1900 GDP data (also from the Maddison (2008) data set).   
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We will also look at a political outcome variable, as well as GDP, because so much of the work 
on Argentina has emphasized the interaction of political and economic distress (e.g. della Paolera 
and Gallo, 2003). We focus on the democracy score of the country, as measured by the “Polity 
2” variable from the Polity IV data set, averaged between 1970 and 2000. This measure subtracts 
a 0-to-10 “Autocracy” score from a 0-to-10 “Democracy” score (both of which constitute indices 
of institutional features), resulting in values ranging from -10 to 10. We use a long-run political 
average, because democracy measures vary substantially from year to year.  Moreover, 
Argentina’s current political environment is far more stable than even its recent past, and looking 
only at the most recent data would understate the extent of the country’s political turbulence. 
(For the period average, Argentina scores 2.06, while the U.S. scores 10.) We will look at GDP 
first, then politics, and then ask whether controlling for current politics helps us to understand the 
differences in GDP. 
 
Our key explanatory variables are per capita GDP in 1900 (from Maddison (2008)), which is 
available for 37 countries, and measures of school enrollment for the same year (from Banks).  
Our school variable adds together the enrollment rates for primary, secondary and university 
education.  (The most important variable is primary education, and results are similar if we use 
that variable alone.)  We have 36 countries with this variable.  Our third variable is the share of 
manufacturing in total output in the early 20
th century, which we obtain from multiple sources 
(Milward and Saul, 1977; Bulmer-Thomas, 1994; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2000; Urquhart, 
1993). (The actual year varies by country, between 1899 and 1920; most come from around 
1913.) This variable captures the degree of industrialization a century ago, but it is only available 
for 16 countries.  Finally, we use the average of the Polity 2 variable between 1870 and 1900 to 
measure institutional development.  
 
As these variables are often quite collinear, and as they are available for different subsamples of 
countries, we begin by examining the univariate relationship between these explanatory variables 
and the logarithm of per capita GDP in 2000.  Regression (1) in Table 3 shows the relationship 
between GDP in 1900 and GDP today.  The lagged variable explains 65 percent of the variation 
in current GDP across the 37 countries.  Essentially, the elasticity is one, meaning that if a 
country was 10 percent richer than another in 1900, then it is ten percent richer today.     28
 
Figure 5 shows the relationship between income in 1900 and income today.  The relationship 
certainly is tight, but Argentina is an outlier, falling substantially below the regression line.  If 
we were to accept the coefficient of 1.01 on log GDP per capita in 1900, then initial income 
levels would only predict a .4 log point difference today. This translates into a difference of 
about 49 percent, which is just about one-fifth of the total difference in incomes between 
Argentina and the U.S.   
 
In the second regression, we look at the connection between our schooling variable and GDP 
today.  The R-squared rises to 70 percent, and as the share of the population attending school 
increases by 5 percent, then GDP today increases by .7 log points. This is about doubling.  This 
captures the enormously strong connection that schooling in the past appears to have with current 
income levels (as in Glaeser, La Porta Lopez de Silanes and Shleifer, 2004).  Figure 6 shows the 
connection between schooling enrollments in 1900 and income today.   In this case, Argentina 
lies on the regression line and the U.S. is somewhat beneath it.   
 
Can the difference in schooling explain current income levels?  We will return to this question 
later, when we have controlled for other variables, but a simple thought experiment using the 
univariate coefficient suggests that power of education.  The gap in enrollment rates between 
Argentina and the U.S. in 1900 is .12.    While Buenos Aires may have had comparable 
enrollment rates to Chicago, outside the city education levels were far lower than in the U.S.  
Multiplying .12 by the estimated coefficient of 14.4 suggests a current income difference of 1.80 
log points, which is actually substantially larger than the realized income difference.  While this 
fact tells us nothing about whether schooling is actually determining the gap or whether it is just 
proxying for something else, the raw coefficient suggests that the cross-country relationship in 
income suggested by 1900 schooling levels can account for the current differences between 
Argentina and the U.S.   
 
Our third regression looks at the share of manufacturing in output around 1913.  We only have 
16 observations, but again, the relationship with current income is positive and significant.  As in 
the case of income, however, even the univariate regression doesn’t suggest that this variable is   29
powerful enough to explain more than a quarter of the current difference between the U.S. and 
Argentina.   
 
Finally, we look at the correlation between political instability in the late 19
th century and GDP 
today.  The explanatory power of this variable is much weaker than the other variables.  As 
Figure 7 shows, there are plenty of once unstable countries that are now quite prosperous.  
Argentina may have been less stable than the U.S., but it was more stable and democratic than 
many European countries which are now far more prosperous.  Still, the correlation between 19
th 
century instability and wealth today might explain something of the current differences between 
Argentine and U.S. wealth.  Using the univariate coefficient, we find that the differences in the 
historical politics measures would predict a .7 log point difference in incomes today, which is 
more than half of the total income differences.   
 
In sum, the univariate relationships suggest that human capital and politics both have a chance at 
explaining significant amounts of the differences in income between the U.S. and Argentina.  
The other variables appear less important.  To sort out the relative importance of these different 
variables, we now turn to multivariate regressions.  In regression (5), we include both GDP and 
schooling as control variables.  The coefficient on GDP drops by almost 75 percent and becomes 
statistically indistinguishable from zero; the coefficient on schooling retains statistical 
significance but drops by one-half.  The bulk of this drop does not come from controlling for 
income, but rather from restricting the sample size.  We don’t have GDP figures in 1900 for 
many poorer countries, especially in Latin America; as a result, the sample becomes wealthier 
and the coefficient (which is smaller across richer countries) becomes smaller.   
 
In regression (6), we control for manufacturing and schooling.  When we control for schooling, 
the coefficient on manufacturing is very small, and just borderline significant at the 10% level.  
The coefficient on the schooling variable is 7.4. When we include GDP in the regression (not 
shown), controlling for manufacturing drives the coefficient on GDP in 1900 essentially to zero; 
the coefficients on the other two variables remain largely unaffected, but the significance of 
manufacturing is removed.  In regression (7), we control for politics as well as the schooling   30
variable.  In this case, politics becomes insignificant, and the coefficient on schooling is 
essentially the same as in the univariate case.   
 
These results strengthen the case for the central role played by differences in schooling, but we 
still need to investigate what happens when the full set of variables is simultaneously included. 
This is what we do in regression (8) (with the exception of manufacturing, which causes our 
sample to shrink too much).  With all three variables, schooling remains significant with a 
coefficient of 7.6.  The other two variables are not.  We take away from these regressions the 
view that no variable, other than schooling in 1900, has a reliable correlation with GDP in 2000.  
The coefficient on schooling ranges from 7.5 to 14.5.  
 
We have already shown that if the schooling coefficient is 14.5 it can more than explain the 
current differences between Argentina and the U.S.  How much of those differences can 
schooling in 1900 predict if the coefficient is smaller?  For example, if the coefficient is 10, then 
the differences in schooling levels in 1900 would predict a 1.2 log point difference in current 
incomes, which is exactly the difference in 2000.  If the coefficient is 7.5, then the schooling 
difference can explain 75 percent of the current income differences.  As such, human capital in 
1900 seems to predict the lion’s share of the difference in current incomes.   
 
But why would historical human capital levels predict such large income differences?  One 
obvious explanation is that human capital in 1900 predicts human capital today, and that current 
human capital differences explain the gap between the U.S. and Argentina.  It is certainly true 
that schooling in 1900 is strongly correlated with schooling today:  the correlation coefficient 
between our enrollment data and total years of schooling in 2000 taken from Barro-Lee (2000) is 
85 percent.   
 
Moreover, years of schooling today certainly strongly predict income levels.  A univariate 
regression of log of GDP on total years of schooling in 2000 finds a coefficient of 0.369 (R-
squared: 0.745).  The gap in total years of schooling between Argentina and the U.S. today is 
3.22 years (12.05-8.83).  Taking the estimated univariate coefficient literally suggests that   31
current schooling differences can explain 98 percent of the current GDP gap between the U.S. 
and Argentina.   
 
But what does this univariate coefficient mean?  Our cross-country coefficient certainly implies a 
much higher effect than estimates from individual-level studies, where an extra year of schooling 
rarely increases wages by more than ten or at most fifteen percent (e.g. Ashenfelter and Krueger, 
1994; Card, 1999).  If that lower range of coefficients represented the link between education 
and productivity, then higher education levels in the U.S. can explain less than one third of the 
difference in incomes between Argentina and the U.S.   
 
How can we reconcile the gap between individual-level estimates of human capital effects and 
country-level estimates of human capital effects?  One view is that the larger coefficients at the 
national level represent human capital spillovers.  Living in a country with more skilled 
individuals may make everyone more productive, perhaps because skilled workers are 
responsibility for determining the level of technology in a given country.  However, cross-
metropolitan area studies of human capital spillovers generate an estimate that is positive, but far 
too small to account for the size of the cross-country coefficient (Rauch, 1993; Acemoglu and 
Angrist, 2000).   
 
One explanation for the difference between the cross-city estimates and the cross-country 
estimates is that – as suggested by Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer (2007), building on the famous 
Lipset (1959) hypothesis – schooling is responsible for political outcomes. In particular, stable 
democratic institutions tend to be predicated on the level of schooling of the citizenry.  
According to this view, Argentina’s problematic political history during the 20
th century has its 
roots in the relatively lower human capital levels of the country in 1900.
3  To test this hypothesis, 
                                                            
3 The relatively low levels of human and physical capital might have influenced political instability in Argentina 
through yet another channel. Campante and Chor (2008) show evidence that, in countries that are relatively land-
abundant, individual schooling tends to be more strongly associated with political activity, particularly for 
“conflictual” modes of activity such as demonstrations. This suggests that, for the case of Argentina, its dearth of 
physical and human capital relative to the U.S. meant that the country’s investments in expanding education were 
partly translated into relatively more political conflict.   32
in Table 4, we reproduce the exercise from Table 3, but now with political stability between 
1970 and 2000 as our dependent variable.   
 
The first four regressions repeat the univariate relationships shown in Table 3.  As before, all of 
these variables predict the outcome variable.  Schooling has the strongest correlation with 
democracy during the late 20
th century, but the other variables also predict democratic stability.  
In the fifth regression, we include all of the variables – again with the exception of 
manufacturing, which depletes too much of the sample.  In this case, schooling continues to 
predict democracy, and the coefficient is essentially unchanged.  None of the other variables 
remain statistically significant.   
 
Can the schooling differences between Argentina and the U.S. explain the instability of late 20
th 
century Argentina, in a quantitative sense?  The difference in the two outcome variables is 7.94.  
The estimated coefficient on schooling is approximately 52.  Multiplying 52 by the schooling 
difference in 1900, yields an estimate of 6.24, which is 79 percent of the observed instability 
difference.  While the schooling differences can’t explain all of the differences in democracy, 
they can certainly go most of the way.   
 
Our final exercise is to see whether the connection between education and democracy can 
explain why schooling in 1900 is so correlated with incomes today.  Going back to the 
specification from Table 3, we now include the 20
th century politics variable in a regression that 
also includes schooling in 1900.  Including this variable causes the coefficient on schooling to 
decrease by more than a third, relative to the univariate regression, but the coefficient remains 
8.87, which is still quite high.  If we include both democracy today and GDP in 1900 as controls, 
then the coefficient on schooling in 1900 falls to 2.7, and is no longer significantly different from 
zero, as shown in regression (9).  We interpret these regressions as suggesting that much of the 
impact of relatively low levels of schooling in Argentina went through political channels.   
 
Whatever remains of the schooling effect may work either through unmeasured political 
channels, or direct human capital effects, or through better technology.  Hopefully, further work 
will better help us to understand the strong connection between historical schooling and current   33
GDP in a broader context.  In our specific case, however, it does seem to be true that Argentina’s 
collapse, relative to the U.S., had much to do with lower education levels.   
 
V.  Conclusion  
 
There were many similarities between the historical trajectories of Chicago and Buenos Aires.  
Both cities were conduits for natural wealth coming from the American hinterland to the markets 
of the east.  Both cities dealt in the same products, first animals and then grain.   Both cities grew 
spectacularly and were among the wealthiest places on earth a century ago.   
 
However, even a hundred years ago there were substantial differences between the two cities.  
Chicago was wealthier and better educated.   Its industries were more advanced and more capital 
intensive.  Its political system was more stable, and its instability was less consequential.   All 
told, Buenos Aires looks more like a place that became rich because of a boom in natural 
resources.  Chicago used those natural resources and then transitioned into becoming a more 
modern industrial place, with substantially greater levels of physical and human capital.   
 
The gap in industrial development and human capital then set the stage for the 20
th century.  
Across countries, schooling in 1900 strongly predicts success today, partially because less 
schooled places have had far worse political outcomes.  America’s greater level of human capital 
in 1900 surely deserves much credit for its track record of 20
th century political stability. In this 
regard, the effects of the lower levels of human capital in Buenos Aires were in turn magnified 
by its overwhelming political importance within Argentina. All in all, the divergence between 
Chicago and Buenos Aires reflects the fact that Buenos Aires in 1900 had wealth levels that were 
far higher than its actual level of human and physical capital accumulation.  
 
From a slightly broader perspective, particularly within the context of Latin America, this 
conclusion sounds somewhat dispiriting. After all, by the standards of the region, Argentina did 
invest early and heavily in human capital accumulation, and achieved a stage of near-universal 
literacy and enrollment way before most of its neighbors – many of which are still considerably 
off that mark. Still, it seems that the human capital lag it displayed in comparison with the US or   34
Western Europe, even in its heyday, ended up trapping the country with relatively immature 
political institutions. This fragility was in turn made more acute by the geographical 
concentration of population and economic activity around Buenos Aires, and eventually plunged 
the country into a cycle of instability from which its economic performance could not escape 
unscathed. President Sarmiento seemed to have his finger on the right issue when he stated that 
“all problems are problems of education”, but for Argentina we might add that this recognition 
was not enough.   35
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Figure 2a:  Annual Wage Data 1870 - 1913












































Source: Jeffrey G. Williamson, "The Evolution of Global Labor Markets since 1830: Background Evidence and Hypotheses", 
 
Figure 2b: Annual Wage Data 1914 - 1945



















































Source: Jeffrey G. Williamson, "The Evolution of Global Labor Markets since 1830: Background Evidence and Hypotheses", 
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Figure 2c: Annual Wage Data 1946 -1970













































Source: Jeffrey G. Williamson, "The Evolution of Global Labor Markets since 1830: Background Evidence and Hypotheses", 
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Figure 3: 






































Sources: Chicago data from the U.S. Census.  Argentina data from Williamson (1995a) and DiTella and Zymelman (1967)
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Figure 4: 


























Sources: Data for Chicago from the U.S. Census IPUMS (Integrated Public Use Microdata Series) at www.ipums.org.  Data for 
Buenos Aires from Primer Censo Nacional (1869), Segundo Censo Nacional (1895), Censo General de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires 
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1870 66.14% 61,874 1883 64.63% 52,231 Age 5-14
1880 54.96% 106,543 1895 57.72% 117,388 Age 6-14
1890 66.39% 214,470 1904 67.45% 188,271 Age 6-15






School Enrollment in Chicago and Buenos Airies
Chicago Buenos Aires
(1) All of the Chicago data are from are from IPUMS, except 1890 which is from the print 
edition of the 1890 census.
(2) Censo Escolar Nacional -correspondiente a fines de 1883 y principios de 1884, Segundo 
Censo Nacional (1895), Censo General de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires (1904), Tercer Censo 
Nacional (1914),  and Cuarto Censo Escolar de la Nación (1948)
Children Aged 5-14 Various Age Groups
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